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 R. v. K.R.J.: Shifting the Balance of 
the Oakes Test from Minimal 
Impairment to Proportionality  
of Effects 
Marcus Moore
*
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. K.R.J. and the Potential Shift from Minimal Impairment
to Proportionality of Effects
The judgment of the Supreme Court in R. v. K.R.J.1 reflects an 
important potential change in the way proportionality analysis is 
conducted in the review of constitutional rights limitations under 
Canada’s Oakes2 test. Until K.R.J., most cases came down to the 
“Minimal Impairment” stage of Oakes.3 Minimal Impairment’s 
customary role as the centrepiece of the analysis was challenged in 
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren, where both the majority and the primary 
dissent placed new weight on the “Proportionality of Effects” stage.4 
Nevertheless, the traditional pattern resumed thereafter.5 However, the 
shift in emphasis heralded by Hutterian Brethren was reprised in K.R.J., 
* Marcus Moore, A.B. (Harvard), Hon. LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), D.Phil. in progress
(Oxford) is a Clarendon Scholar at the University of Oxford. 
1 R. v. K.R.J., [2016] S.C.J. No. 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “K.R.J.”]. 
2 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
3 See e.g., Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 38-36
[hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
4 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]. 
5 Hogg, supra, note 3.
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which endorsed and carried further the Court’s earlier reasoning.6 K.R.J. 
demonstrated this effort to more fully consider the Proportionality of 
Effects question,7 raising the possibility of it inaugurating a permanent 
change in how the proportionality doctrine will be applied in Charter8 
review cases in Canada — a change in which we see Proportionality of 
Effects displace Minimal Impairment centre stage. 
This potential shift does not implement a change to the overall 
substantive threshold for justifying rights limitations.9 Rather, it appears 
driven by conceptual rationales, and entails a switching of sides in a related 
ongoing debate on the appropriate style of judicial reasoning in Charter 
adjudication.10 The shift should indeed accomplish its specific conceptual 
goals, enhancing the rationality and conceptual coherence of Canadian 
proportionality jurisprudence.11 These advances, and their implications, are 
significant gains. However, the change seems unlikely to put an end to the 
judicial style debate, in which there is merit on both sides, within a dynamic 
which it does not alter.12 Overcoming that impasse would require further 
changes in proportionality analysis to address the effects of deeper issues 
embedded in the conceptual substructure underlying the debate. Presently, 
there is little to suggest that such an endeavour is under consideration.13 In 
the meantime, while the style debate may not yet be fully resolved, it takes 
nothing away from the gains made on key conceptual issues. 
Beyond an assessment of the change in relation to its rationales, the 
potential shift in the practice of proportionality portended by K.R.J. raises 
other important questions. Three of these are addressed in this paper. The 
first concerns what to make of different formulations that have been put 
forth of the newly-emphasized Proportionality of Effects inquiry. The second 
seeks to anticipate the post-shift relationship between Minimal Impairment 
and Proportionality of Effects, and what this will mean for various classes of 
cases. The third question tracks disagreements among the three judicial 
opinions in K.R.J. regarding the evidential requirements for justifying an 
infringement, and the implications of an unavailability of proof. 
                                                                                                                       
6 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at paras. 77-79. 
7 Id., at paras. 80-114 (Karakatsanis J.), paras. 124-129 (Abella J.), paras. 134-161 (Brown J.). 
8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
9 See Part III, infra. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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2. Structure of this Article 
The discussion below proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly surveys 
necessary background to the changes in proportionality analysis at issue 
from K.R.J. The changes themselves are detailed in Part II. Part III 
explains and appraises the changes in relation to the motivations driving 
them. In Part IV a few additionally important questions are examined 
arising from K.R.J.’s prospective shift in emphasis from Minimal 
Impairment to Proportionality of Effects. A short concluding section 
wraps up the discussion. 
PART I. THE BACKGROUND: SECTION 1, PROPORTIONALITY,  
AND OAKES 
It is surely the case that the most important provision of Canada’s 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the first one: 
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.14 
By these terms, section 1 guarantees the rights and freedoms which 
follow it, yet also limits them.15 In seeking to “balance the interests of 
society with those of individuals and groups”, section 1 ordains for the 
courts a task frequently delicate and complex.16 The tool of choice for 
this difficult task is the doctrine of “proportionality”.17 The doctrine of 
proportionality offers a fixed, authoritative, analytical structure designed 
to systematize the general exercise of considering the key factors 
relevant to justifying rights restrictions, and thereby guide case-by-case 
judicial decisions as to whether a given restriction is acceptable.18 
Canada’s version of the doctrine, elaborated by Dickson C.J.C. in  
R. v. Oakes,19 and since having come to be commonly referred to as the 
                                                                                                                       
14 Charter, supra, note 8, at s. 1. 
15 Oakes, supra, note 2, at para. 63. 
16 Id., at para. 70. 
17 Id. For more on the doctrine of proportionality transnationally, see e.g., Alec Stone Sweet 
& Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 72 [hereinafter “Stone Sweet”]. 
18 See e.g., Charles-Maxime Panaccio, “In Defence of Two-Step Balancing and 
Proportionality in Rights Adjudication” (2011) 24 C.J.L.J. 109 at, 111-114. 
19 Oakes, supra, note 2. 
146 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2018) 82 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
“Oakes test”, has become known throughout the world.20 Pursuant to it, 
if a court finds a prima facie infringement of a right by government 
action prescribed by law, the infringement may be allowed as justified if 
the conditions comprising the test, which have crystallized in the 
jurisprudence as summarized below, are satisfied:21 
(1) “Pressing and Substantial Objective”: Does the government measure 
have a pressing and substantial objective?22 
(2) “Rational Connection”: Does the government measure bear a rational 
connection to its objective?23 
(3) “Minimal Impairment”: Does the government measure minimize the 
impairment of the right in pursuing the objective?24 
(4) “Proportionality of Effects”: Is there a proportionality between the 
salutary and deleterious effects of the government measure?25 
Applying the test, by stepping through the foregoing sequence of 
inquiries one-by-one, if the answer at any stage is negative, the infringement 
is unjustified, and the government measure unconstitutional.26 If the 
government measure satisfies all four conditions, then the infringement is 
found to be proportionate, and hence pursuant to the doctrine, is justified, 
with the government measure accordingly determined to be Charter-
compliant.27 
PART II. THE SHIFT: FROM MINIMAL IMPAIRMENT  
TO PROPORTIONALITY OF EFFECTS 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in K.R.J. is significant in signalling a 
potential shift in emphasis among the constituent stages of Canada’s 
Oakes test of proportionality. 
                                                                                                                       
20 Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality 
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501 at, 502 [hereinafter 
“Choudhry”]. 
21 See e.g., Hogg, supra, note 3. 
22 Oakes, supra, note 2, at para. 69. 
23 Id., at para. 70. 
24 Id. 
25 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 
at para. 95 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”]. 
26 See e.g., Hogg, supra, note 3. 
27 Id. 
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1. Minimal Impairment’s Traditional Pre-Eminence in 
Proportionality Analysis in Canada 
Throughout the era of Charter adjudication, the proportionality 
doctrine’s third step of “Minimal Impairment” has figured as the “central 
element”28 of the test, the “heart and soul of s. 1 justification” in the 
courts.29 It is this stage of the Oakes test that has been pivotal in most 
cases dealing with the justifiability of a rights infringement.30 As Peter 
Hogg wrote: 
We have noticed that courts have usually readily accepted that a 
legislative purpose is sufficiently important to justify overriding a 
Charter right (first step). We have also noticed that courts have usually 
readily accepted that a law is rationally connected to its objective 
(second step). We shall shortly notice that courts have usually readily 
accepted that a law does not have a disproportionately severe impact on 
the persons to whom it applies (fourth step). In short, for the great 
majority of cases, the arena of debate is the third step, the requirement 
of [minimal impairment].31 
Meanwhile, as the passage from Hogg alludes to, during the period where 
the Minimal Impairment step was dominant, little work was done by the 
fourth stage of “Proportionality of Effects”.32 
2. An Increased Importance of Proportionality of Effects? 
(a) Hutterian Brethren 
A notable exception was Hutterian Brethren, where the Supreme Court 
explicitly embraced Proportionality of Effects as the “decisive analysis” in 
the case.33 There, the majority devoted 32 paragraphs of its judgment to 
consideration of Proportionality of Effects,34 while the principal dissent 
similarly spent 27 paragraphs on it.35 Commenting on the issue in the 
                                                                                                                       
28 Kent Roach & Robert Sharpe, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed. (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2013), at 78 [hereinafter “Roach”]. 
29 Hogg, supra, note 3. 
30 See e.g. Roach, supra, note 28, at 78. 
31 Hogg, supra, note 3. 
32 Id. See also Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 75: “this stage of the justification 
analysis, it has not often been used”. 
33 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 78. 
34 Id., at paras. 72-103. 
35 Id., at paras. 150-176. 
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majority judgment, McLachlin C.J.C. rejected the hypothesis that the 
Proportionality of Effects stage might be redundant, noting that “the 
minimal impairment and proportionality of effects analyses involve 
different kinds of balancing”.36 Justice Abella, in her dissenting opinion, 
went so far as to say: “In my view, most of the heavy conceptual lifting 
and balancing ought to be done at the final step — proportionality [of 
effects]. Proportionality is, after all, what s. 1 is about.”37 
However, notwithstanding Hutterian Brethren’s strong endorsement 
of a more significant role for Proportionality of Effects,38 the pattern of 
adjudication thereafter continued to be one in which Minimal 
Impairment was “the focus of most litigation under the Charter,” while 
Proportionality of Effects bore little influence.39 
(b) K.R.J. 
Recently, the Supreme Court’s judgment in K.R.J. seems to have taken 
to heart that which was said in Hutterian Brethren, and indeed gone further 
in the direction there contemplated.40 Writing for the majority in K.R.J., 
Karakatsanis J. stated that “[w]hile the minimal impairment test has come 
to dominate much of the s. 1 discourse in Canada, this final 
[Proportionality of Effects] step permits courts to address the essence of 
the proportionality enquiry at the heart of s. 1.”41 Putting this revised 
approach into practice, the majority quickly passed through the Minimal 
Impairment stage and then inquired into Proportionality of Effects in-depth 
over the course of 38 paragraphs.42 Its analysis at this final stage led it to 
arrive at the conclusion that one of the challenged legislative provisions 
was justified, while the other failed and thus violated the Charter.43 With 
the latter ruling, the theory that the Proportionality of Effects step is purely 
redundant has been overtaken by events.44 
                                                                                                                       
36 Id., at paras. 75-76. 
37 Id., at para. 149. 
38 Sara Weinrib, “The Emergence of the Third Step of the Oakes Test in Alberta v. 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 68 U.T. Fac. L.R. 77 [hereinafter “Weinrib”]. 
39 Roach, supra, note 28, at 78. On the influence of Proportionality of Effects, Hogg wrote 
“it has never had any influence on the outcome of any case”: supra, note 3. 
40 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at paras. 78-79. 
41 Id., at para. 79. 
42 Id., at paras. 77-114. 
43 Id., at paras. 115-116. 
44 See e.g., Hogg, supra, note 3; Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 75.  
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The Proportionality of Effects stage of the Oakes test was also the 
locus of disagreement with the Court’s majority by both of the other 
opinions in the case, each dissenting in part: Abella J. would have found 
that both provisions at issue fail Proportionality of Effects,45 while 
Brown J. would have upheld both as satisfying it.46 
3. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in K.R.J. is significant in rekindling 
the prospect, which had dimmed since being lit years earlier by Hutterian 
Brethren, that the long-marginalized final “Proportionality of Effects” 
step of Oakes will harbour new importance in the future. 
Indeed, K.R.J. signals a potential shift in the balance of “balancing” 
power within the conduct of proportionality analysis in Canada from the 
balancing implicit in the Minimal Impairment inquiry to that prescribed 
by the Proportionality of Effects stage. 
PART III. UNDERSTANDING AND APPRAISING THE SHIFT 
The potential change in the practice of proportionality by Canadian 
courts which arises from K.R.J. seems not to stem from an intent to alter 
the substantive threshold for justifying rights limitations. No such motive 
is mentioned, and no such effect is apparent.47 
Rather, what is manifest in K.R.J. is a shift in emphasis, among the 
component stages of the Oakes test, from Minimal Impairment to 
Proportionality of Effects.48 In order for the infringement of a right to be 
justified, it must still satisfy both of these queries (as well as the two 
preceding elements of the test). This change, as opposed to being aimed 
at a change in the substantive threshold for justification, seems to have 
taken place in order to accommodate corrections contemplated to address 
conceptual concerns related to the test, along with responsiveness to a 
long-standing critique of the style of judicial reasoning used in Charter 
adjudication. 
                                                                                                                       
45 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 130. 
46 Id., at para. 162. 
47 Id. 
48 Id., at paras. 77-79. 
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I turn next to surveying the specifics of these evident rationales, and 
to appraising the likelihood of K.R.J.’s shift realizing these objectives 
behind it. 
1. Conflation of the Final Two Inquiries of the Test: Minimal 
Impairment and Proportionality of Effects 
(a) The Rationale 
One of the conceptual concerns fuelling the change in K.R.J. pertains to 
a disjunction between the conceptual structure of the proportionality 
doctrine and its customary application in Canada.49 This concern is 
focused in particular on the final two steps of the Oakes test.50 Minimal 
Impairment is meant to inquire into the magnitude of the restriction of the 
right in consideration of the challenged law’s purpose; Proportionality of 
Effects exists to compare the legislation’s salutary and deleterious actual 
effects.51 Thus, “minimal impairment and proportionality of effects 
analyses involve different kinds of balancing”, as McLachlin C.J.C. 
summarized in Hutterian Brethren.52 The concern, as she acknowledged, is 
that “the distinction … has not always been strictly followed by Canadian 
courts”.53 Instead, in practice, a law’s effects were often imported into the 
Minimal Impairment analysis, so as to allow for a full balancing of factors 
at that pivotal stage where the constitutionality of the provision was bound 
to be decided. The need to distinguish between the final two steps of the 
test was also underlined by Abella J., dissenting.54 While attention had thus 
been drawn to the issue by the Supreme Court in Hutterian Brethren, the 
pattern of the two steps conflation nevertheless continued to be prevalent 
afterward — until K.R.J.55 
In K.R.J., the Court, in a majority opinion written by Karakatsanis J., 
emphasized the “fundamentally distinct role” played by the final stage 
Proportionality of Effects analysis.56 The judgment in the case, quoting 
                                                                                                                       
49 Id., at paras. 77, 79. See also Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 76; Grimm, infra, 
note 61, at 393.  
50 Id., at paras. 76-79. See also Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at paras. 75-77. 
51 See notes 24-25. See also K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 77; Hutterian Brethren, supra, 
note 4, at para. 77. 
52 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 76. 
53 Id. 
54 Id., at paras. 150-153. 
55 See notes 38-39.  
56 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 77. 
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Thomson Newspapers v. Canada,57 noted how Minimal Impairment 
balances “the ends of the legislation and the means employed”, whereas 
Proportionality of Effects scrutinizes “whether the benefits which accrue 
from the limitation are proportional to its deleterious effects”.58 The 
judgment went on to explain that, while the final stage was initially 
conceived in R. v. Oakes as a comparison between the deleterious effects 
and the legislative objective, this was too narrow a characterization of the 
final step, and it was reformulated in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp.
59
 to compare the legislation’s deleterious and salutary effects.60 
The conflation of Minimal Impairment and Proportionality of Effects 
that occurred prior to K.R.J. was not just a matter of distinguishing 
conceptually separate inquiries, it was also an issue of the appropriate 
division of labour between these steps, based on their respective roles 
within the overall conceptual structure of proportionality doctrine. This 
was highlighted by former German constitutional judge Dieter Grimm, 
who argued that the conceptual “inaccuracy” of the conflation resulted in a 
situation where the Canadian practice “does more than it promises in the 
[Minimal Impairment] step, and has little use for the [Proportionality of 
Effects] step”, which effectively offered only “repetition” if the effects 
were considered a second time there.61 When the steps are properly 
analytically separated, Grimm added, fewer cases are decided at the 
Minimal Impairment step.62 Canada’s habit of making Minimal 
Impairment the focus, he wrote, was a “premature anticipation of the final 
balance”63 typically to be considered under Proportionality of Effects. 
This corollary of the initial proposition that conceptually separate 
steps had been conflated and needed to be distinguished was endorsed by 
the Supreme Court in K.R.J., as the majority adopted Abella J.’s 
statement from Hutterian Brethren that “most of the heavy conceptual 
lifting and balancing ought to be done at the final step” of Proportionality 
of Effects: “Proportionality is, after all, what s. 1 is about.”64 Citing 
Grimm and concordant views from other scholarly works, Karakatsanis J. 
                                                                                                                       
57 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson”]. 
58 Id., at para. 125. 
59 Dagenais, supra, note 25. 
60 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at endnote 6. 
61 Dieter Grimm, “Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence” 
(2007) 57:2 U.T.L.J. 383, at 396 [hereinafter “Grimm”]. 
62 Id., at 387. 
63 Id., at 388. 
64 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 78; Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 149. 
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stated for the Court majority in K.R.J. that: “While the minimal impairment 
test has come to dominate much of the s. 1 discourse in Canada, this final 
[proportionality of effects] step permits courts to address the essence of the 
proportionality enquiry at the heart of s. 1.”65 
It is therefore evident that one of the motives behind the change in the 
way the Oakes test was applied in K.R.J. was to better separate in 
practice the conceptually distinct inquiries at the Minimal Impairment 
and Proportionality of Effects steps; associated with that was an intent to 
shift the emphasis within the Oakes test from the former stage towards 
the latter, which was perceived as conceptually closer-related to the 
overall question of proportionality which Oakes is meant to embody. 
(b) Appraisal 
This first rationale for the potential change manifest in K.R.J. as to 
how proportionality may be conducted in the future in Canada would 
seem a worthy objective. Maintaining the conceptual separation of the 
steps of the doctrine of proportionality is more than a matter of accurate 
record-keeping; as Justice Grimm. explains, it “has legal value”:66 
The disciplining and rationalizing effect, which is a significant 
advantage of the proportionality test over a mere test of reasonableness 
or a more or less free balancing, as in many US cases, is reduced when 
the four stages are not clearly separated. Each step requires a certain 
assessment. The next step can be taken only if the law that is 
challenged has not failed on the previous step. A confusion of the steps 
creates the danger that elements enter the operation in an uncontrolled 
manner and render the result more arbitrary and less predictable.67 
The corollary objective of relying less on Minimal Impairment and more 
on Proportionality of Effects in the way the test is applied also seems 
appropriate — particularly once these two steps are no longer conflated but 
separated. Conceptually, Proportionality of Effects encompasses the fullest 
range of factors that might merit a place on the scales of balance, within the 
overall question of the impugned legislation’s proportionality. I would also 
submit that ultimately what matters most in terms of assessing 
proportionality is how the legislation operates in the real world. In that case, 
                                                                                                                       
65 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 79, endnote 7. 
66 Grimm, supra, note 61, at 395. 
67 Id., at 397. 
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the final step is most à propos, as that is where it turns the test’s gaze — 
measuring Proportionality of Effects. 
If the rationale is worthy, the question then to be asked is whether the 
change evident in K.R.J. can be expected to achieve it. Here, the change 
made is crafted precisely to correct this conceptual problem. This is 
demonstrated in the judgment itself, where the two steps are clearly 
separated,68 and the test’s gravitational centre is in a weighty Proportionality 
of Effects discussion.69 In adhering to the analytical distinction between the 
steps, and leaving the preponderance of factors (being the effects) to be 
weighed under Proportionality of Effects, rather than imported into the 
Minimal Impairment evaluation, the Court in K.R.J. looks to have 
successfully addressed the conceptual concern described in this section. 
The change should therefore result in better correspondence between 
the conceptual design of the proportionality doctrine and its application 
in Canada, and in conjunction, enhanced analytical clarity at each step of 
the test’s application. 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has long been committed to 
applying the proportionality doctrine in a highly contextual manner: that is, 
sensitive to the facts of how a challenged measure operates in the real 
world.70 It has rejected the alternative, viz. the intellectually hollow exercise 
of balancing abstract principles without account of how those principles are 
actually implicated in the case at hand, or remote from sensing the actual 
human impact both individually and in the shared life of community.71 
K.R.J.’s shift in emphasis to Proportionality of Effects should assist with 
this, by putting centre stage the balance of these practical impacts. 
2. The Conceptual Inaptness of Minimal Impairment for Deciding 
Cases Where Only Drastic Rights Restrictions Would Attain the 
Government Objective 
(a) The Rationale 
The second evident rationale for K.R.J.’s change in the way 
proportionality is applied under the Oakes test is a concern that only the 
                                                                                                                       
68 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at paras. 70-76 (Minimal Impairment), 77-114 (Proportionality of 
Effects). 
69 Id., at paras. 77-114 (Karakatsanis J.), 124-129 (Abella J.), 134-161 (Brown J.). 
70 See e.g., RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, 
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 63 (S.C.C.). 
71 Id. 
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Proportionality of Effects inquiry is conceptually apt to address the 
justifiability of drastic rights infringements in situations where these are 
necessary to pursuing the government goal.72 Conceptually, the least 
drastic means of attaining a valid legislative purpose, regardless of how 
drastic it may be, should inherently satisfy the Minimal Impairment 
test.73 In theory, at the Proportionality of Effects stage is where such a 
measure might be found to be disproportionate, depending on whether 
the law’s salutary effects — including attainment of the law’s purpose — 
are not in proportion to its deleterious effects, notably the drastic 
curtailment of the right.74 A justification analysis fixated on Minimal 
Impairment complicates the ability to deal with cases of this type. 
This was a concern forcefully expressed by former President of the 
Supreme Court of Israel, Aharon Barak, who noted that Minimal 
Impairment is bound by “the need to realize” the legislative 
objective, whereas Proportionality of Effects can examine “whether 
the realization of this proper objective is commensurate with the 
deleterious effect upon the human right”.75 Reflecting on the Israeli 
experience in relation to that of Canada, Barak even suggested that with 
Minimal Impairment as the fulcrum of the test, rights are insufficiently 
protected.76 That such may be the case in other countries is certainly 
possible; however, if such account were submitted of the history of 
rights protection in Canada under the Charter, in my view it would not 
be sustainable because of the issue addressed in Part A: the conflation 
of Minimal Impairment and Proportionality of Effects saw Minimal 
Impairment in practice operate as a more holistic determination of the 
proportionality of the challenged legislation, with considerations which 
conceptually might belong to Proportionality of Effects absorbed 
explicitly or implicitly into the central Minimal Impairment decision, as 
discussed. 
However, this did come at a cost of compounding the conceptual 
concerns in the cases at issue in this section, where the least drastic means is 
indeed drastic. In these “drastic least drastic limit” cases, what was required 
in order to avoid the substantive deficit in rights protection apprehended by 
                                                                                                                       
72 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at paras. 76, 79. See also Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at 
paras. 76, 78. 
73 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4. See also Weinrib, supra, note 38. 
74 Id. 
75 Aharon Barak, “Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 369, at 
374 [hereinafter “Barak”]. 
76 Id., at 373. 
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Barak resulted in a conceptual Catch-22. As McLachlin C.J.C. explained in 
Hutterian Brethren, the only way courts could avoid the deficit was by 
“reading down the government’s objective within the minimal impairment 
analysis” as something less than what it really was.77 On the surface, such a 
practice might again raise concern of whether the substantive standard for 
proportionality was altered — this time in the other direction of improperly 
finding valid laws to be unconstitutional. The riposte is the same: as a 
general matter, one must assume that usually the reading down of goals was 
only a pragmatic way of justifying in the conceptual terms of Minimal 
Impairment what was really a more holistic determination that the legislation 
was disproportionate, arrived at as part of the discussed conflation of the two 
final steps of the test. 
Thus, with Minimal Impairment as the focus of analysis, drastic least 
drastic limit cases resulted in one or the other of the following 
undesirable consequences: where the legislation was upheld, the 
appearance was given that the conceptually necessary Proportionality of 
Effects inquiry was short-circuited; conversely, where the legislation was 
found to violate the Charter, the appearance was given that the legislative 
object that is supposed to be accepted at the Minimal Impairment stage, 
as part of the conceptual question posed, was instead challenged. 
Hutterian Brethren, citing President Barak, recommended a shift to 
Proportionality of Effects in order to deal with this class of cases: 
“Where no alternative means are reasonably capable of satisfying the 
government’s objective, the real issue is whether the impact of the rights 
infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefits of the impugned 
law.”78 However, as noted, the pattern of reliance on Minimal Impairment 
nevertheless continued thereafter, until K.R.J.79 
K.R.J. was a case of this type. The amendments contained in  
section 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code allowed for the 
retrospective application, at the sentencing stage, of broadened 
restrictions on persons convicted of certain sexual offences against  
youth under 16.80 This drastically impaired the section 11(i) Charter 
right, “if the punishment for the offence has been varied between the 
time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of  
the lesser punishment”.81 Although drastic, it was accepted that the 
                                                                                                                       
77 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 76. 
78 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 76. 
79 See note 55. 
80 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 161(1)(c)-(d).  
81 Charter, supra, note 8, s. 11(i). 
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measures were the least drastic means, within the meaning of the 
Minimal Impairment test.82 
Whereas in prior cases this might have been conclusive of the matter, or 
the objective might have been read down such that the measures were not 
minimally impairing, in K.R.J., the Court held that the central issue was still 
ahead. Justice Karakatsanis expressed that in these circumstances, “[t]he 
more difficult issue is whether the benefits achieved … outweigh the 
deleterious effects”.83 Responding to the risk of the legislative objective 
being “read down” if Minimal Impairment had been relied upon as decisive 
— she further noted that “proceeding to this final [Proportionality of Effects] 
stage permits appropriate deference to Parliament’s … full legislative 
objective”.84 
Thus, while it was acknowledged that “the minimal impairment test 
has come to dominate much of the s. 1 discourse in Canada”, the 
Proportionality of Effects analysis was the essential question for the 
drastic least drastic limit scenario at issue in K.R.J. Accordingly, we see 
all three opinions in the case follow the mold of a test focused not on 
Minimal Impairment but on Proportionality of Effects. 
(b) Appraisal 
This second basis for K.R.J.’s shift in emphasis among the stages of 
the Oakes test is also well-founded. It allows for drastic least drastic limit 
cases to be rationally dealt with, accepting the necessity of the harsh 
measure from the perspective of the legislative goal, without necessarily 
accepting its proportionality in the broader sense, and without diluting 
what the objective is such that the measure might go beyond what is 
necessary. It is not considered that the substantive threshold for the 
justification of rights infringements in Canada has been a problem, as a 
general matter, whether because of Minimal Impairment’s inability to 
challenge drastic least drastic limits, or because of the workaround of 
“reading down” legislative goals.85 The opposing substantive distortions 
these would respectively tend to produce were avoided, as discussed, 
because, prior to K.R.J., Minimal Impairment often operated de facto as a 
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85 I mean overall or consistent under-protection of rights or over-interference with the 
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holistic assessment of proportionality. However, while there might have 
been no actual substantive problem, the appearances created thereof 
constitute a different kind of problem, since justice must not only be 
done, but must be seen to be done.86 The change in K.R.J. could 
rightfully aim to resolve that issue. 
Can the shift in emphasis apparent in K.R.J. achieve these intended 
benefits? K.R.J. gives reason to think so. None of the opinions in the case 
disputed that the measures, though drastic, were minimally impairing. 
Yet each went on to consider in-depth whether they might run afoul of 
Proportionality of Effects, and thereby be unjustified. The majority’s  
38 paragraph discussion of the final stage testifies to this, as does its 
conclusion that one of the two measures violated the Charter despite 
having been the least drastic means of pursuing its objective.87 In-depth 
consideration of Proportionality of Effects was also the basis of Abella 
J.’s opinion that both measures violated the Charter,88 and of Brown J.’s 
disagreement that either should fail justification.89 With the shift, there 
was also no pressure to read down the legislative objective, and no sign 
that it was. For example, the majority rejected as too narrow the 
claimant’s proposed construction,90 and accepted that the goal, to “better 
protect children from the risks posed by offenders”, was “vital” in 
confronting a “serious societal problem, a statement that needs no 
elaboration”.91 With a division of labour between Minimal Impairment 
and Proportionality of Effects consonant with their conceptual roles, the 
appearance of a substantive problem of one type or another, as might 
have occurred if the analysis confined itself to Minimal Impairment, was 
never created. Thus, it would seem that the change manifest in K.R.J. can 
realize the rationales at issue in this section. 
Additionally, to the extent that the handling of drastic least drastic 
limit cases previously under Minimal Impairment might have created a 
risk of a substantive error in individual cases, that risk is diminished by 
the change seen in K.R.J. Because Minimal Impairment was commonly 
used in practice as a holistic assessment, that risk may have been small. 
But if an error occurs, the stakes are high, as it will mean, as mentioned; 
either underprotecting rights by short-circuiting any challenge to the goal 
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in relation to its deleterious side-effects, or unduly impairing the 
legislature by reading down pressing and substantial legislative goals that 
can only be attained by drastic means. The benefit of reducing those risks 
is also creditable to the change in K.R.J. 
3. The Long-standing Critique of “Lack of Transparency” 
(a) The Rationale 
The third reason given by K.R.J. for its shift from Minimal 
Impairment to Proportionality of Effects is responsive to a long-standing 
critique of the style of reasoning of Charter adjudication during the time 
that Minimal Impairment was the decisive question.92 This critique 
revolves around a lack of transparency in how the outcome of the 
analysis was arrived at. According to this view, the subjective value-
judgments that were being made (and which had to be made) as part of 
deciding the issue of justification, were being concealed by the objective-
seeming terms used.93 
A strong voice of this critique has been that of Danielle Pinard.94 In 
“La promesse brisée de Oakes”, she laments “l’illusion de la possibilité 
de décisions scientifiquement objectives quant au caractère raisonnable 
de limites apportées aux droits et libertés”.95 Rather, she maintains that 
“des considérations de l’ordre des valeurs sont au coeur de la 
justification”.96 Indeed, she says, behind the illusion of objectivity, 
subjective value-judgments have always driven the assessment of rights 
limitations: “au-delà de toutes les étapes de tous les tests et au-delà de 
toutes les données factuelles disponibles, c’est en réalité cette simple 
« pondération de valeurs » qui fonde le jugement sur la justification des 
limites apportées aux droits”.97 
Among the various aspects of the Oakes test that project this illusion 
of objectivity are the terms of Minimal Impairment, whose inquiry 
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93 Id.; Pinard, infra, note 95. See more generally Luc Tremblay et Grégoire Webber, eds., 
La limitation des droits de la Charte: essais critiques sur l’arrêt R. c. Oakes (Montréal: Éditions 
Thémis, 2009) [hereinafter “Webber”]. 
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constitutes: “whether the means adopted to achieve the end sought do so 
by impairing as little as possible the right”. Put another way, “[t]he test at 
the minimum impairment stage is whether there is an alternative, less 
drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial 
manner.”98 As Peter Hogg summarizes, it is a test of the least drastic 
means.99 Framed merely in terms of a measurement of the scope of the 
restriction relative to alternatives, it suggests a certain objectivity and 
value-neutrality: 
[I]n practice, the Court’s dealing with [Minimal Impairment] looks 
much more value laden… If indeed the attempt to avoid policy 
considerations and value judgements is responsible for the reluctance to 
enter the [Proportionality of Effects] step, the Court risks self-deception 
when all the value-oriented considerations have been made under the 
guise of a seemingly value-neutral category.100 
In contrast, Proportionality of Effects is seen as engaging more 
openly and overtly in the subjective weighing of values said to inevitably 
underlie justification decisions. Jamie Cameron, cited by K.R.J. on this 
point, argued that the Proportionality of Effects step: 
should not be so easily discounted… [T]his branch of the section 1 
analysis asks an important question. By assessing the proportionality of 
its deleterious effects and salutary benefits it considers, in direct and 
explicit terms, whether the consequences of the violation are too great 
when measured against the benefits that may be achieved.101 
Thus, as a solution to Minimal Impairment’s problem of intransparency, 
re-orienting the focus of Oakes instead towards the Proportionality of Effects 
inquiry would make the subjective value-judgments that are central to the 
balancing of interests, that in turn is inevitably determinative of the 
justifiability of rights limitations, more open and accessible.102 In Cameron’s 
words, the “underlying values [balanced in Proportionality of Effects] 
should be at the forefront of the analysis and not an afterthought which only 
enters the equation after the justifiability of the limit has been established” at 
the Minimal Impairment stage.103 
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Hutterian Brethren had also noted the openness-enhancing feature of 
Proportionality of Effects, quoting President Barak who approved of how 
it “requires placing colliding values and interests side by side and 
balancing them according to their weight”.104 
The influence of the rationale described in this section is clearly 
evident in K.R.J., where the majority remarked how: 
[Proportionality of Effects] allows courts to stand back to determine on 
a normative basis whether a rights infringement is justified … 
Although this examination entails difficult value-judgments, it is 
preferable to make these judgments explicit, as doing so enhances the 
transparency and intelligibility of the ultimate decision.”105 
(b) Appraisal 
Considering this third rationale for K.R.J.’s change in the conduct of 
the Oakes test, the concern with lack of transparency is legitimate. The 
justifiability of a rights limitation is not an objective determination, as 
some aspects of the Oakes test might suggest. Subjective value-
judgments inevitably need to be made, and are made, as part of balancing 
incommensurable factors. That includes at the Minimal Impairment step, 
despite terms which connote a neutral measurement. And that disconnect 
was all the greater when the Minimal Impairment step, in practice, 
comprised a holistic but not always explicit weighing of a more diverse 
set of factors, prior to K.R.J. The disconnect was grounds for some to 
worry about why subjective value-judgments that were being made and 
needed to be made, were in these senses concealed rather than open. 
It is also true, as expressed in K.R.J., that Proportionality of Effects is 
designed to weigh competing values in much more “direct and explicit 
terms” than Minimal Impairment: identifying the benefits and 
drawbacks, and placing them side by side on the scale of balance.106 
For these reasons, a shift to Proportionality of Effects could rationally be 
expected to make justification determinations more open and transparent. 
Does K.R.J. bear out the realization of this aspiration? At the 
Proportionality of Effects stage of analysis, the three opinions in the case 
are undoubtedly open about their reasons for judgment. The majority’s 
view seemed to be that the retrospective application of the amendments 
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at issue could not be justified merely by reference to bases that could 
apply generally to almost any criminal law; there had to be a special 
temporal basis — either in the social conditions the amendments address, 
or via the amendment itself constituting an important legal innovation. 
Hence, for example, regarding section 161(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, 
the majority stated: 
In particular, the Crown has provided no temporal justification for the 
retrospective limitation, nor much evidence to establish the degree of 
enhanced protection s. 161(1)(c) provides. Temporal considerations are 
relevant in this content because, at its root, s. 11(i) is about the timing 
of changes to penal laws. … When it comes to s. 11(i), timing can be 
everything.107 
With respect to section 161(1)(d), by contrast, it noted the presence of 
such a basis in the form of: 
emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and 
technological context. This evolving context has changed both the 
degree and nature of the risk of sexual violence facing young persons. 
As a result, the previous iteration of s. 161 became insufficient to 
respond to the modern risks children face. By closing this legislative 
gap and mitigating these new risks, the benefits of the retrospective 
operation of s. 161(1)(d) are significant and fairly concrete.108 
As far as the other opinions, Abella J.’s dissent was similarly 
transparent about its reasons, particularly its dissatisfaction with the 
government evidence. She stated that “s. 11 imposes a singularly onerous 
evidentiary burden on the Crown to justify a violation under s. 1”, and 
saw “no reason to bridge the significant empirical gaps in the evidence 
with inferences”.109 Meanwhile, the dissent of Brown J. clearly evinced, 
throughout, a view that deference was required. He noted that the 
amendments targeted “grave, persistent” harms, saw a legislative gap in 
the prior provisions, and emphasized that there are limits to the evidence 
possible to empirically validate yet-untried measures.110 
While there is perhaps no way to reliably measure the transparency of 
a judgment, certainly the opinions in K.R.J. openly and intelligibly 
disclose, at the Proportionality of Effects stage, the judges’ reasons for 
arriving at their conclusions on the outcome of the test. 
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But in assessing the rationale presently at issue, the fact that the 
change promises and delivers greater transparency is only a partial 
picture. The transparency rationale for the change in K.R.J. cannot be 
appraised in isolation, for it is not an independent consideration, but is 
part of a larger question of the style of judicial reasoning appropriate in 
rights adjudication. 
Throughout the period of proportionality’s use in applying section 1 of 
the Charter, Canadian courts’ reliance on the Minimal Impairment inquiry 
reflected a different perspective on that question. Within that view, the 
concern is rather with excess subjectivity in rights adjudication.111 Excess 
subjectivity creates the risk of decisions being of an arbitrary character, 
rather than legal determinations. The stakes are particularly high for such 
concerns in Charter review, where at issue are human rights on one hand, or 
the constitutionality of government action, on the other. 
Against this background, Proportionality of Effects is both more 
subjective — and as the transparency critique noted — more open and 
explicit about its subjectivity than Minimal Impairment. It prescribes 
neither the factors, nor a consistent means of identifying the factors, to be 
balanced, other than that they fall under the broad umbrella of “effects”. 
A functional distinction between direct and indirect effects would be 
difficult to draw, and if indirect effects are fair game, there is no end to 
the chain of them, and no limit to the effects that might be considered.  
A subjective choice of factors therefore colours the inquiry even  
before the weighing begins.112 At that point, as President Barak said, 
Proportionality of Effects’ transparent style “requires placing colliding 
values and interests side by side and balancing them according to their 
weight”.113 This presentation magnifies attention on the weighing, 
highlighting its contestability, and thus emphasizing its subjectivity. For 
instance, Weinrib quotes Professor Naáma Carmi of the University of 
Haifa as lamenting how the use of that style in Israel “gives the 
impression that there are no clear principles or standards guiding the 
decision”, only “subjective estimation and assessment”.114 In Canada, a 
discomfort with the extent of Proportionality of Effects’ subjectivity has 
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perhaps been evident in the inquiry’s articulation using the obscure 
legalistic terms “deleterious” and “salutary” effects rather than terms 
synonymous but more consistent with the stated rationale of transparency 
and lay-intelligibility, such as “costs” and “benefits”.115 
A language of costs and benefits had been used in the United States; 
and more broadly, the “free balancing” approach often used in the U.S. 
was viewed as undesirable from the perspective of concern with excess 
subjectivity.116 Use of the whole doctrine of proportionality, as an 
instrument for assessing rights limitation under section 1, is underpinned 
by a belief that the “disciplining and rationalizing effect” produced by 
the legal confines of its analytical structure “is a significant advantage” 
by comparison with a more subjectively wide-open weighing.117 But the 
advantage becomes largely illusory if all it means is going through the 
first three steps of the doctrine as little more than a formality before 
reaching as a decisive analysis Proportionality of Effects where one 
engages in essentially the same free balancing exercise. 
From that perspective, more promising was the option, which had also 
been followed by the European Court of Human Rights, of relying as the 
crucial step on Minimal Impairment.118 The inquiry it poses limits and 
prescribes the factors to be weighed. Moreover, due to its framing as 
measuring the scope of a rights infringement, it comes across as more 
technistic and less subjective than Proportionality of Effects.119 This 
might help “manage potentially explosive environments, given the 
politically sensitive nature of rights review”, and accordingly shelter 
courts from a hostile atmosphere of more frequent and heated charges of 
activism than what reliance on Proportionality of Effects might 
encourage.120 On that point, Justice Grimm describes the “fear that a 
court might make policy decisions at this [Proportionality of Effects] 
stage rather than legal decisions”.121 In K.R.J., Karakatsanis J. seems to 
acknowledge the basis of these concerns, confirming that: 
[T]his final step allows courts to stand back to determine on a 
normative basis whether a rights infringement is justified in a free and 
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democratic society. Although this examination entails difficult value-
judgments, it is preferable to make these judgments explicit, as doing 
so enhances the transparency and intelligibility of the ultimate 
decision.122 
But while seeming to recognize the countervailing concern of increased 
subjectivity, the passage leaves unclear precisely why the course of action 
of enhancing transparency at that cost is preferable. Throughout the 
judgment more broadly, K.R.J. witnesses the Court switch sides in the 
long-standing debate about the appropriate form of judicial reasoning in 
Charter review. As an inherent consequence of the shift to Proportionality 
of Effects, this needs no explanation. But put forth as a rationale for that 
shift, more fulsome reasoning might be hoped for, given the context of an 
opposition of interests in which the views on both sides have merit: formal 
and informal styles of judicial reasoning are both legitimate and widely 
used throughout the law in Canada and the world. Nothing in section 1 of 
the Charter obviously provides for one or the other style of ascertaining 
them. Both positions are also underpinned by important legal and 
constitutional virtues. Transparency is tied to values such as intelligibility, 
justification, and democracy. Meanwhile, constraint of the subjective 
aspect of decision-making is associated with core commitments such as 
consistency, certainty, equal justice, and the rule of law. Although a 
subjective element is inevitable regardless of which stage of 
proportionality is emphasized, a manifest effort to constrain it is integral to 
law’s legitimacy, and to public confidence in it as an institution.123 In the 
face of these conflicting interests, K.R.J.’s shift only results in switching 
sides in the debate, without resolving the underlying dilemma or fully 
disclosing the preference it expresses for the transparency interest. 
Additionally, K.R.J.’s wholesale endorsement of the transparency 
interest combined with the absence of any evident weight given to the 
countervailing interest in the constraint of subjectivity in crucial legal 
determinations, feels surprising, and possibly ironic in this context of a 
larger frame in which proportionality rather than a hierarchical approach 
is being endorsed and applied as the proper means to deal with conflicts 
among fundamental interests. 
Overcoming the debate’s impasse would require further changes in 
proportionality analysis to address the implications of deeper issues 
embedded in the conceptual substructure underlying the debate. 
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Presently, there is little to suggest that such an endeavour is under 
consideration. 
In the meantime, a “proportional” approach to Proportionality of 
Effects might recognize the value of the interests on the opposite side 
from transparency. And to the extent that the transparency rationale is 
necessary to K.R.J.’s prospective shift in emphasis in the conduct of the 
Oakes test, one might hope in a subsequent case for a more balanced 
view of any net benefit claimed on that side. 
PART IV. SOME OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE 
SHIFT TO PROPORTIONALITY OF EFFECTS 
Beyond its rationales and capacity to achieve them, the potential 
change to the practice of proportionality in Canada brought by K.R.J. 
raises additional important questions. I address three of these below. 
1. Sizing Up Different Formulations of Proportionality of Effects 
A new emphasis on the Proportionality of Effects inquiry, and indeed 
the possibility that it may become the “heart” of the Oakes test in the 
future, put a spotlight on the question it poses. Multiple different 
formulations of it are referenced in K.R.J. What can be made of them? 
The following passage from K.R.J. helps explain the relationship 
between two of those formulations: 
In Oakes, this final stage of the proportionality analysis was initially 
conceived as a comparison between the deleterious effects of the limiting 
measure and the law’s objective. However, in Dagenais v. Canadian 
Broadcasting Corp., 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, Lamer 
C.J. reformulated the test to account for the “proportionality between the 
deleterious and the salutary effects of the measur[e]” because 
characterizing the final step “as being concerned solely with the balance 
between the objective and the deleterious effects of a measure rests on 
too narrow a conception of proportionality”.124 
Thus, the inquiry articulated in Oakes of whether there is “a 
proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible 
for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has 
been identified as of ‘sufficient importance’” has been superseded by the 
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formulation from Dagenais.125 Dagenais’s explanation for its reformulation 
was that even if the first three elements of the Oakes test are satisfied, 
“and the deleterious effects are proportional to the objectives, it is still 
possible that, because of a lack of proportionality between the deleterious 
effects and the salutary effects, a measure will not be reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.126 This could 
be, for example, because the measure, although having at least a rational 
connection to its objective, is not well-tailored to its achievement,127 and 
will not significantly achieve it.128 In such a case, achieving the objective 
might not be among the salutary effects. 
K.R.J. also quotes a third distinct account of the Proportionality of 
Effects inquiry, taken from Thomson which casts the question as 
“whether the benefits which accrue from the limitation are proportional 
to its deleterious effects as measured by the values underlying the 
Charter”.129 It may be wondered whether the words “as measured by the 
values underlying the Charter” make this a different conception than that 
from Dagenais. And it might also be queried whether the reference to 
benefits which accrue from the limitation make it a different conception 
from the Dagenais formulation which inquires into the benefits of the 
measure. K.R.J.’s use of both the Thomson and Dagenais descriptions in 
parallel, without any reckoning of discrepancies, suggests the Court’s 
perception of none. This might additionally make sense as far as the 
latter question, in that the limitation itself often might have no direct 
benefits; but insofar as it is part and parcel of the measure which does, 
those benefits could fairly be said in that context to indirectly “accrue 
from the limitation”.130 
A fourth formulation of Proportionality of Effects referred to in K.R.J. 
specifies that at this final stage of the proportionality analysis, the Court 
must “weig[h] the impact of the law on protected rights against the 
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case the amendments as a whole). K.R.J. reinforces that it is the measure, not the provisions, which 
are the subject of the test. 
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beneficial effect of the law in terms of the greater public good”.131 Similar 
accounts can often be found in earlier cases; for instance: “the real issue is 
whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the 
likely benefits of the impugned law”.132 Does this formulation, which 
places the rights impairment on one side, and the effects on the other, 
conflict with the Dagenais formulation cited in K.R.J.? 
Again, the fact that both formulations are referenced together in 
K.R.J., without discussion of potential conflict between them, suggests 
no perception of one. However, it is not necessarily readily apparent why 
this is so. The answer may be that isolating only the rights limitation on 
the deleterious side, but discounting from the benefits side other costs 
apart from the rights limitation, is ultimately the same comparison as 
placing all the deleterious effects on one side and all the (undiscounted) 
salutary effects on the other. In other words: 
 
Although these two formulations therefore may ultimately be 
consistent, a question remains as to which is preferable? As I see it, each 
has a frame for which it is better-suited. 
Where the purpose of quoting a description of Proportionality of 
Effects is to relate it to the broader question of whether the limit of a 
right is justified, the version which singles out the rights infringement 
may be advantageous. This is because it more closely tracks the way 
proportionality is used as a conceptual vehicle for answering that overall 
question, namely by assessing whether the measure is proportionate to its 
impairment of the right. The Proportionality of Effects formulation that 
isolates the restriction on the right is framed in terms of a similar 
opposition, but focused on effects. Accordingly, one might say that it is 
more intuitive, in terms of its relationship to the overall question. And it 
better maintains focus on the overarching question before the court of 
whether a constitutional right has been violated. 
                                                                                                                       
131 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at  
para. 122 (S.C.C.), quoted by K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 77.  
132 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 76. 
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But when it comes to turning Proportionality of Effects from a notion 
into a test — an analysis to be carried out — the Dagenais formulation of 
salutary versus deleterious effects seems to have the upper hand. The fact 
that the overall justification assessment includes a step whose focus is on 
effects reflects a conviction that that broader question cannot be 
answered without considering, beyond the legislation’s objective and 
how it limits rights, the practical consequences of the legislation at issue. 
And if practical consequences are to be considered at all, they represent 
the kind of factor that normally only makes sense to consider the full 
range of. The infringement of the right is the most salient deleterious 
effect, given that it is the basis of the dispute. But at a stage which 
“stands back” from the conceptual details of the justification 
examination, in order to get a picture of the practical consequences of the 
measure, the relevance of other significant deleterious effects, regardless 
of type, should not be excluded.133 Indeed, if one were to place on the 
scales the significant practical benefits of whatever kind (not limited to 
achievement of the objective) that accrue from the measure, but not 
apply the same standard to its drawbacks, it would distort the resulting 
sense obtained of the measure’s practical consequences. That being  
the case, the Dagenais version’s framing of the inquiry — and thereby of 
the analysis to be carried out pursuant to it — as balancing in general the 
salutary and deleterious effects of the measure, helps to ensure that other 
deleterious effects are not overlooked. By contrast, given that it is an 
infringement claim being adjudicated, and that the justification issue only 
arises as a result of the court having concluded that there is a prima facie 
violation of the right, there is little chance of a court losing sight of that 
as part of considering the effects of the measure, such as to require 
recourse to a formulation of the test which singles it out. 
The Dagenais formulation of salutary versus deleterious effects also 
allows for the balancing process to be carried out (and explained) in a 
more straightforward way. The formulation which isolates the rights 
infringement on one side of the scale, conversely, requires the other 
deleterious effects to be discounted from the benefits, and then placing 
only the resulting net benefits on the opposite side of the scale from the 
infringement. This would add unnecessary complexity as well as risk of 
confusion to the application of Proportionality of Effects — undermining 
the rationale, in shifting emphasis to that stage, of enhancing justification 
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analysis’s “transparency and intelligibility”.134 For these reasons, the 
Dagenais version seems better-suited to Proportionality of Effects’ 
application. And indeed in K.R.J., the opinions set up their balancing of 
the effects in these terms of salutary versus deleterious effects.135 
2. Mapping the Relationship Between Minimal Impairment and 
Proportionality of Effects After the Shift 
The potential changes in the conduct of the Oakes test heralded by 
K.R.J. also cause one to wonder what the division of labour between 
Minimal Impairment and Proportionality of Effects will be in the future, 
and what the change will therefore mean for different kinds of cases. 
As discussed in Part II.A, traditionally Minimal Impairment has been 
the determinative step of proportionality assessment in Canada. K.R.J. 
seems to contemplate a direct challenge to that long-standing state of 
affairs. As expressed in the judgment by Karakatsanis J.: 
While the minimal impairment test has come to dominate much of the s. 1 
discourse in Canada, this [Proportionality of Effects] step permits courts to 
address the essence of the proportionality enquiry at the heart of s. 1.136 
She additionally endorsed the statement of Abella J., dissenting in 
Hutterian Brethren, that “most of the heavy conceptual lifting and 
balancing ought to be done at the final step — proportionality [of 
effects]. Proportionality is, after all, what s. 1 is about.”137 In K.R.J., it 
was indeed the case that most of the normative heavy lifting and 
balancing was done at the Proportionality of Effects stage.138 
However, the doctrine of proportionality comprises a rationally-ordered 
sequence of analysis, and one only reaches the Proportionality of Effects 
stage if the challenged measure has satisfied the preceding three steps — 
including Minimal Impairment.139 As a result, unless the question of 
Minimal Impairment is swept over, or the test for it relaxed to the point that 
its satisfaction is “usually readily accepted by courts”, as Peter Hogg 
described the pattern with the two prior steps, then Minimal Impairment will 
                                                                                                                       
134 Id. 
135 Id., at paras. 80-114 (Karakatsanis J.), paras. 140-161 (Brown J.); Abella J.’s brief partial 
dissent is framed in terms of its departure from the majority reasons, and does not mention the 
majority’s formulation of the test.  
136 Id., at para. 79. 
137 Id., at para. 78, quoting Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 149. 
138 See note 7. 
139 Hogg, supra, note 3. 
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continue to be relevant in many cases and sometimes decisive.140 The K.R.J. 
majority seemed to confirm this, objecting to Brown J.’s suggestion that it 
was rendering Minimal Impairment obsolete, by stating that “the minimal 
impairment test remains an important part of assessing whether Parliament 
has discharged its burden under s. 1”.141 
At the same time, the shift modelled in K.R.J. will result in many other 
cases reaching and being decided at the Proportionality of Effects stage, 
where previously that prospect was effectively pre-empted by virtue of 
the final stage being subsumed into Minimal Impairment. Thus, a 
division of labour between Minimal Impairment and Proportionality of 
Effects may ultimately result. The structure of the doctrine of 
proportionality as comprising analytically discrete steps, dealing with 
different ways in which a measure might fail to be proportionate, 
suggests that such a division of labour is entirely appropriate.142 
What might this division of labour between Minimal Impairment and 
Proportionality of Effects look like in the future? 
Minimal Impairment, as noted, asks “whether the means adopted to 
achieve the end sought do so by impairing as little as possible the right”. In 
practice, a more workable and realistic standard is often applied, querying 
whether the measure “falls within a range of reasonable alternatives”143 that 
would achieve the objective “in a real and substantial manner”.144 Where 
alternatives exist, this comprises another balancing exercise besides 
Proportionality of Effects — this one balancing the impairment and the 
objective.145 Where the impairment is disproportionate to the objective, and 
there are less-impairing alternatives, a measure will not survive Minimal 
Impairment, and that step will be decisive. Where there are either no less-
impairing alternatives, or the objective is proportionate to the impairment, 
the measure will go on to have the proportionality of its effects assessed, 
which will be decisive in the sense that the measure’s constitutionality will 
come down to it, whether the measure ultimately passes or fails there. 
Beyond this, since both steps involve a balancing of related factors, 
might it be possible to conceive at a finer level how the change brought 
about by K.R.J. might play out for different kinds of cases? In Hutterian 
                                                                                                                       
140 See note 31. 
141 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at endnote 5.  
142 See e.g., Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 460-465. 
143 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 4, at para. 54. 
144 Id., at para. 55. 
145 Id., at para. 76. 
(2018) 82 S.C.L.R. (2d) PROPORTIONALITY OF EFFECTS 171 
Brethren, LeBel J. counselled against a “sharp” approach to a division of 
labour, implying a need to consider how the two steps might operate 
harmoniously, as part of the overall assessment: 
I believe that the proportionality analysis depends on a close 
connection between the final two stages of the Oakes test. The court’s 
goal is essentially the same at both stages: to strike a proper balance.146 
Of the cases that should reach the Proportionality of Effects stage, let us 
first consider the class where the impairment is disproportionate to the 
objective, but there are no less-infringing measures. For these cases, it 
would seem that the only way the challenged measure might satisfy 
Proportionality of Effects is if it has significant salutary effects other than 
the objective, capable of overcoming the disproportion between the 
impairment and the objective, as well as any other deleterious effects. By 
contrast, cases in this class without a major salutary effect should, after the 
change in K.R.J., fail to be justified at the Proportionality of Effects stage; 
in the past, these cases would have likely failed Minimal Impairment, but 
at the unwanted cost of “reading down” the legislative goal.147 
Turning to the other class of cases that should reach Proportionality of 
Effects, those where the objective is proportionate to the impairment, 
there would seem to be a few streams within it where the cases should 
fail at the final stage. The first would be cases where there is a significant 
deleterious effect, other than the infringement, that flips the scales, and 
also outweighs any salutary effects beyond realizing the objective. The 
second stream would be cases where there exists at least a rational 
connection between the means and the goal, but the means will achieve 
the objective in something less than a real and substantial manner. In 
such cases, the weight of realizing the goal that was on the scale at the 
Minimal Impairment stage would need to be reduced on the subsequent 
Effects scale in proportion to the degree of its non-realization, which 
could alter the balance. And third would-be cases involving a combination 
of both of these features. By contrast, cases where the objective will be 
realized in a real and substantial manner, and where the infringement is 
the only major deleterious effect, should pass Proportionality of Effects 
and thus be justified. 
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The following chart summarizes these suppositions: 
 
3. The Impact of Proportionality of Effects on Issues of Evidence 
The potential change brought about by K.R.J. to the conduct of the 
Oakes test also raises questions relative to the evidential requirements for 
justification of rights infringements. 
The issue of the test’s evidence requirements is well-known. In the 
words of Sujit Choudhry, it has presented an “enormous institutional 
dilemma”.148 Choudhry described a foreground debate as to whether 
there should be a uniform threshold for all cases, a variable threshold 
based on a prescribed set of contextual factors, or a fully flexible 
threshold based on the unique context of each case.149 And he highlighted 
a background problem of “a conflict between the demand for definitive 
proof to support each stage of the section 1 analysis, and the reality of 
policymaking under conditions of factual uncertainty”.150 
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Both branches of the evidence issue figure prominently in the 
dissension that existed among the Supreme Court opinions in K.R.J. 
Beginning with the first branch, on one side was the view of Abella J. 
that section 11 of the Charter imposed on the government “the highest 
possible evidentiary burden, namely, to demonstrate through 
‘compelling evidence’” the infringement’s justification.151 On the other 
side, Brown J., invoking the persistent nature of the mischief targeted 
by the legislation, saw considerable deference as warranted to avoid 
“hold[ing] Parliament to an exacting standard of proof, thereby 
denying Parliament the room necessary to perform its legislative 
policy-development role when addressing a chronic social problem”.152 
Courts “must therefore be careful to avoid insisting upon too strict an 
evidentiary burden”, Brown J. concluded.153 The majority staked a 
middle ground. It acknowledged the potential shortfall of empirical 
evidence and accepted that “reason and logic are important 
complements to tangible evidence”.154 Provided those are factored in, 
it endorsed Dickson C.J.C.’s dictum in Oakes that the test imposes a 
“stringent standard of justification”.155 In spite of Brown J.’s plea that 
it “not lose the proportionality forest for the Oakes trees”, the majority 
found that no justification for the retrospective operation of section 
161(1)(c) of the Criminal Code had been provided, and hence it 
violated the Charter.156 Meanwhile, also rebuffing Abella J.’s invitation 
to not “bridge the significant empirical gaps in the evidence with 
inferences”, it accepted the justification of section 161(1)(d).157 
It may be that the extensive debate in K.R.J. regarding what evidence 
was required and was satisfactory had nothing to do with K.R.J.’s change in 
the conduct of the Oakes test. Such debates, after all, have occurred often 
enough.158 However, it may be that they are related. K.R.J.’s shift from 
Minimal Impairment to Proportionality of Effects places the spotlight on 
legislative effects. Effects typically encompass the future. Hence, the 
change may diminish the relative proportion of observation, and 
correspondingly increase the relative proportion of prognostication, that 
together constitute justification claims. In terms of types of evidence, this 
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may translate into a lesser proportion of empirical or otherwise established 
facts, and a greater proportion of inferences or otherwise projected facts. 
The latter are, by definition, more uncertain; and if that translates into their 
being viewed as more “speculative”,159 and thus less willingly accepted, the 
evidential standard at the Proportionality of Effects stage may need to be 
relaxed, in conjunction with the shift to greater emphasis on that stage, in 
order to avoid an unintended alteration in the substantive threshold of 
justification. Failing that, in the end, Brown J.’s apprehensions may prove 
true, that effects are not “amenable to demonstrative proof”, in terms of 
how demonstrable proof at this stage would be interpreted and applied.160 
This brings us to the second branch of the evidence issue: 
“policymaking under conditions of factual uncertainty”. K.R.J. again 
demonstrates starkly divergent approaches on how to deal with this. For 
Abella J., the scenario of a right being seriously impaired with an 
uncertain social pay-off is unjustified. The burden of proof is on the 
government; the benefit of the doubt goes to the individual right.161 
Conversely, for Brown J., the prospect of indefinite perpetuation of a 
persistent social problem where that will result if the legislature cannot 
try new and unproven means of addressing it, justifies a limitation 
adjudged to be the least drastic means. Parliament, and by extension 
society, cannot be paralyzed by unavailable proof; deference is 
required.162 Betwixt these two approaches, the majority again navigates a 
middle path. On one hand, it quotes Choudhry, who in turn quotes La 
Forest J. in recognizing uncertainty as a common phenomenon in 
policymaking:163 
Public policy is often based on approximations and extrapolations from 
the available evidence, inferences from comparative data, and, on 
occasion, even educated guesses. Absent a large-scale policy 
experiment, this is all the evidence that is likely to be available. Justice 
La Forest offered an observation in McKinney which rings true: 
“[d]ecisions on such matters must inevitably be the product of a mix of 
conjecture, fragmentary knowledge, general experience and knowledge 
of the needs, aspirations and resources of society”.164 
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On the other hand, the majority affirms that “[n]onetheless, s. 1 
mandates that the limitation on the right be demonstrably justified. As 
Dickson C.J. wrote in Oakes, this is a ‘stringent standard of 
justification’.”165 In light of the majority’s succeeding application of the 
test, these comments suggest a willingness to use logic and inferences to 
bridge gaps in the evidence, but not a willingness to defer to the 
legislature on the basis of uncertainty alone. Thus, the majority accepted 
the imperfect evidence on section 161(1)(d) of the Criminal Code as 
meeting the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, but not the 
more seriously incomplete evidence on section 161(1)(c).166 
As with the first branch of the evidence issue discussed in this 
section, the sharply divergent approaches in how to deal with uncertainty 
may merely coincide with the change in the conduct of the Oakes test 
implemented in K.R.J. However, given that that change took the form of 
a shift to Proportionality of Effects, it may conversely reflect the 
previously-noted fact that effects typically encompass the future, so that 
evidence is likely to be substantially predictive and seldom certain. The 
fact that this debate in K.R.J. was related to the change in the conduct of 
proportionality assessment that it undertook is supported by Brown J.’s 
comment that: 
[G]iven the complex social context in which Parliament often develops 
policy ... it will sometimes be difficult, if not impossible, for the state to 
provide reliable and direct evidence of the benefit its measures will 
achieve.167 
Yet, given the frequency alluded to by Choudhry and La Forest J. with 
which the legislature confronts complex or persistent social problems, 
simply deferring to the legislature where such conditions are present risks 
granting it constitutional free rein. By the same token, due to the same 
frequency of those conditions, a stance on evidence requirements which 
precludes the justification of legislation whose benefits are uncertain risks 
paralyzing the legislature and society. The majority’s more flexible 
approach, which falls back on general principles of civil proof, may be 
workable in some cases. However, if K.R.J. signals an increased reliance 
on Proportionality of Effects in the future, it may well wind up that Brown 
J.’s concern about cases where proof is impossible will, because of effects’ 
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difficulty to assess and their future-orientation, be more common than was 
the case until now when the test focused on Minimal Impairment. 
As a result, consistent with the majority’s reliance on general 
principles of civil proof, where there is an impossibility to prove the 
benefits of a measure, it may be that the Proportionality of Effects step 
should be judged inapplicable by a showing that it cannot be administered 
since the evidence is impossible to obtain. In these impossibility of proof 
cases, proof of the impossibility would displace the requirement of proof 
of Proportionality of Effects, and the test would then be effectively 
determined at the Minimal Impairment step, based on whether the 
government has proven that it is the least drastic means.168 The burden 
should lie on the government to prove the impossibility in lieu of positive 
proof of the proportionality of the effects. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The shift in emphasis in K.R.J. from Minimal Impairment to 
Proportionality of Effects marks an important potential change to the 
future conduct of Canada’s Oakes test — charged both to protect human 
rights and to delimit them where the democratic advancement of vital 
communal interests so warrants. By virtue of this shift, long-standing 
conceptual issues in the way proportionality doctrine has typically been 
applied in Canada appear to be successfully addressed. Hence, K.R.J. 
implements the doctrine’s analytical separation of Minimal Impairment 
and Proportionality into functionally discrete steps. Simultaneously, it 
shifts the balance of “balancing power” from the former stage to the 
latter, which contemplates a set of factors overtly more complete and 
focused on the practical impact of the decision. And the change allows 
for the proportionality of legislation which is drastic but the only way of 
pursuing its goal to be assessed more openly with respect both to its 
effect on rights and to the plenitude of its objective. The transparency 
inherent in reasoning under the Proportionality of Effects question is also 
enhanced, as compared to under Minimal Impairment where subjective 
value-judgments are concealed behind that inquiry’s more objective-
seeming terms. However, the subjectivity of the reasoning called for by 
Proportionality of Effects is also more pronounced, which can make it 
seemingly more arbitrary, contestable, and controversial. Illustrative of 
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both of these dimensions of the change in the style of reasoning is K.R.J. 
with its clear reasons and clear dissension. The potential changes 
heralded by K.R.J. to the conduct of proportionality in Canada also raise 
other important questions. Multiple formulations of the Proportionality 
of Effects inquiry have been used, with the version which balances 
salutary and deleterious effects being the one seemingly best-suited to 
application of the test. The order of analysis inherent in the doctrine of 
proportionality should mean that Minimal Impairment will continue to be 
relevant and sometimes decisive, notwithstanding Brown J.’s reading of 
the majority’s reasons as rendering that step “otiose”.169 However, 
K.R.J.’s contemplated shift in emphasis among the steps should see far 
more cases reaching and being decided under Proportionality of Effects 
than formerly was the case. This would particularly be expected in cases 
where drastic means are the only means, and cases where the legislative 
object is proportionate to the rights infringement. In the process, as 
demonstrated by K.R.J. itself, greater reliance on Proportionality of 
Effects is likely to exacerbate existing controversies over evidence 
requirements under the Oakes test — unless adjustments are made to 
compensate in general for the more complex matter of proving effects 
and in particular for the event of an impossibility of proof by the party on 
whom the burden rests. 
All in all, while this and other matters remain to be worked out, what 
has been achieved by K.R.J.’s prospective change in the conduct of the 
Oakes test certainly suggests its shift in emphasis from Minimal 
Impairment to Proportionality of Effects constitutes a step in the right 
direction. 
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